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ABSTRACT
Mobile phones and other handheld devices incorporating cellular capabilities,
such as Personal Digital Assistants, are ubiquitous. Besides placing calls, these
devices allow users to perform other useful tasks, including text messaging and
phonebook entry management. When cell phones and cellular devices are
involved in a crime or other incident, forensic specialists require tools that
allow the proper retrieval and speedy examination of data present on the
device.
For devices conforming to the Global System for Mobile
Communications (GSM) standards, certain data such as dialed numbers, text
messages, and phonebook entries are maintained on a Subscriber Identity
Module (SIM). This paper gives a snapshot of the state of the art of forensic
software tools for SIMs and an explanation of the types of digital evidence they
can recover.1
Keywords: Mobile Phone, Forensic Tool, Subscriber Identity Module
1. INTRODUCTION
The Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) standards for cellular
networks, originally developed by the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations, were continued by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute and are now maintained by the 3rd
Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Commercial GSM service was started
in mid-1991. By 1993, thirty-six GSM networks were operating in twenty-two
countries (Dechaux and Scheller 1993). Although begun in Europe, GSM is an
international standard with compliant networks operational in more than 200
countries around the world (GSM World 2006).
Subscriber Identity Modules (SIMs) are synonymous with mobile phones and
devices that interoperate with GSM cellular networks. Under the GSM
framework, a cellular phone is referred to as a Mobile Station and is partitioned
into two distinct components: the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) and the
Mobile Equipment (ME). As the name implies, a SIM is a removable
1

Certain commercial products and trade names are identified in this paper to illustrate technical
concepts. However, it does not imply a recommendation or an endorsement by NIST
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component that contains essential information about the subscriber. The ME,
the remaining radio handset portion, cannot function fully without one. The
SIM’s main function entails authenticating the user of the cell phone to the
network to gain access to subscribed services. The SIM also provides a store
for personal information, such as phone book entries and text messages, as well
as service-related information.
GSM standards are organized in a number of ways, one of them being the
phase of capabilities they support. The three phases defined are phase 1, phase
2, and phase 2+, which correspond roughly to first, second, and 2.5 generation
network facilities. SIMs are often classified according to the phase of the
specifications supported, which is recorded in an element of its file system
(i.e., EFPhase). Another class of SIMs in early deployment is UMTS SIMs
(USIMS) used in third generation (3G) UMTS (Universal Mobile
Telecommunications Service) networks. USIMs are enhanced versions of
present-day SIMs, containing backward compatible information.
Some of the earliest, general purpose, forensic tools for mobile phones targeted
SIMs, not only because of detailed specifications available for them, but also
because of the highly relevant and useful digital evidence that could be
recovered. This paper provides a review of present-day forensic tools for SIMs
and the type of data they recover, plus an assessment of their capabilities and
limitations.
2. SIM CHARACTERISTICS
The SIM-ME partitioning of a cell phone stipulated in the GSM standards has
brought about a form of portability. Moving a SIM between compatible cell
phones automatically transfers with it the subscriber’s identity and the
associated information and capabilities. In contrast, present-day CDMA
phones do not employ a SIM. Analogous SIM functionality is instead directly
incorporated within the device. While SIMs are most widely used in GSM
systems, comparable modules are also used in iDEN (Integrated Digital
Enhanced Network) phones and UMTS user equipment (i.e., a USIM).
Because of the flexibility a SIM offers GSM phone users to port their identity,
personal information, and service between devices, eventually all cellular
phones are expected to include (U)SIM-like capability. For example,
requirements for a Removable User Identity Module (R-UIM), as an extension
of SIM capabilities, have been specified for cellular environments conforming
to TIA/EIA/IS-95-A and -B specifications, which include Wideband Spread
Spectrum based CDMA (3GPP2 2001).
At its core, a SIM is a special type of smart card that typically contains a
processor and between 16 to 128 KB of persistent electronically erasable,
programmable read only memory (EEPROM). It also includes random access
memory (RAM) for program execution, and read only memory (ROM) for the
operating system, user authentication and data encryption algorithms, and other
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applications. The SIM’s hierarchically organized file system resides in
persistent memory and stores such things as names and phone number entries,
text messages, and network service settings. Depending on the phone used,
some information on the SIM may coexist in the memory of the phone.
Alternatively, information may reside entirely in the memory of the phone
instead of available memory on the SIM.
Though two sizes of SIMs have been standardized, only the smaller size shown
in Figure 1 is broadly used in GSM phones today. The module has a width of
25 mm, a height of 15 mm, and a thickness of .76 mm, which is roughly the
footprint of a postage stamp. Though similar in dimension to a MiniSD or an
MMCmobile removable memory card supported by some cell phones, SIMs
follow a different set of specifications with vastly different characteristics. For
example, their 8-pin connectors are not aligned along a bottom edge as with
removable media cards, but instead form a circular contact pad integral to the
smart card chip, which is embedded in a plastic frame. Also, the slot for the
SIM card is normally not accessible from the exterior of the phone to facilitate
frequent insertion and removal as with a memory card, and instead, typically
found in the battery compartment under the battery.

Figure 1: SIM Format
When a SIM is inserted into a phone handset and pin contact is made, a serial
interface is used for communicating between them. A SIM can be removed
from a phone and read using a specialized SIM card reader and software
through the same interface. Standard-size smart card adapters are also
available for SIMs, which allows them to be inserted into and read with a
conventional smart card reader.
2.1 File System Organization
As shown in Figure 2, the file system of a SIM is organized in a hierarchical
tree structure, composed of the following three types of elements (3GPP
2005a):
•

Master File (MF) - the root of the file system that contains dedicated
and elementary files.

•

Dedicated File (DF) - a subordinate directory to the master file that
contains dedicated and elementary files.

77

Journal of Digital Forensics, Security and Law, Vol. 1(2)
•

Elementary File (EF) - a file that contains various types of formatted
data, structures as either a sequence of data bytes, a sequence of fixed
size records, or a fixed set of fixed size records used cyclically.

The GSM standards define several important dedicated files immediately under
the MF: DFGSM, DFDCS1800, and DFTELECOM. For the MF and these DFs,
several EFs are defined, including many that are mandatory. The EFs under
DFGSM and DFDCS1800 contain mainly network related information respectively
for GSM 900 MHz and DCS (Digital Cellular System) 1800 MHz band
operation. EFs for U.S. 850 MHz and 1900 MHz bands are found respectively
under those DFs as well, and typically contain identical information. The EFs
under DFTELECOM contain service related information. The contents of specific
EFs are discussed later in the paper.

Figure 2: SIM File System
Though SIM file systems are highly standardized, the standards allow
flexibility such that their content can vary among network operators and
service providers. For example, a network operator might not use an optional
file system element, might create an additional element on the SIM for use in
its operations, or might install a built-in function to provide a specialized
service.
2.2 Security
Smart cards, including SIMs, employ a range of tamper resistance techniques
to protect the information they contain. In addition, various levels of rights
exist that are assigned to a DF or EF, to control the conditions of access (3GPP
2005a):
•

Always - Access can be performed without any restriction.
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•

Card Holder Verification 1 (CHV1) - Access can be performed only
after a successful verification of the user’s PIN, or if PIN verification
is disabled.

•

Card Holder Verification 2 (CHV2) - Access can be performed only
after a successful verification of the user’s PIN2, or if PIN2
verification is disabled.

•

Administrative - Access can be performed only after prescribed
requirements for administrative access are fulfilled.

•

Never - Access of the file over the SIM/ME interface is forbidden.

The SIM operating system controls access to an element of the file system
based on its access condition of and the type of action being attempted (3GPP
2005a). For example, actions on EFs include searching, reading, and updating
the contents. While reading and searching the contents of a particular EF
might be allowed without CHV1 verification (i.e., an Always access
condition), updating might likely require CHV1 being correctly verified as a
prerequisite (i.e., a CHV1 access condition). In general, CHV1 protects core
SIM data selectively against unauthorized reading and updating, while CHV2
protects mainly optional data. Both CHVs contain 4-8 digits and can be
modified or disabled by the user.
The SIM operating system allows only a preset number of attempts, usually a
limit of three, to enter the correct CHV before further attempts are blocked.
Submitting the correct Unblock CHV value, also known as a PUK (PIN
Unblocking Key), resets the CHV and the attempt counter. If the identifier of
the SIM (i.e., its Integrated Circuit Chip Identifier or ICCID) is known, the
Unblock CHV for either CHV1 or CHV2 can be obtained from the service
provider or the network operator. The ICCID is normally imprinted on the
SIM along with the name of the network provider. If needed, the identifier can
also be read with a SIM tool from an EF, EFICCID, since the Always access
condition applies by definition. If the number of attempts to enter an Unblock
CHV value correctly exceeds a set limit, normally ten attempts, the card
becomes blocked permanently.
Authenticating a device to a network securely is a vital function performed via
the SIM. Cryptographic key information and algorithms within the tamper
resistant module provide the means for the device to participate in a challengeresponse dialogue with the network and respond correctly, without exposing
key material and other information that could be used to clone the SIM and
gain access to a subscriber’s services. Cryptographic key information in the
SIM also supports stream cipher encryption to protect against eavesdropping
on the air interface (Vedder 1993, Willassen 2003).
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3. DIGITAL EVIDENCE
Various types of digital evidence can be recovered from a SIM. Evidence can
be found scattered throughout the file system in various EFs located under the
MF, as well as under the aforementioned DFs. Several general categories of
evidence can be identified:
•

Service-related Information

•

Phonebook and Call Information

•

Messaging Information

•

Location Information.

The remainder of this section reviews EFs commonly used by forensic
specialists, which fall under each category (Dearsley 2005, Willassen 2003).
The standardized EF names and abbreviations found in the 3GPP TS 11.11
Technical Specification (3GPP, 2005a), though sometimes unusual, are used
throughout this discussion for consistency.
3.1 Service-related Information
The Integrated Circuit Card Identification (ICCID) is a unique numeric
identifier for the SIM that can be up to 20 digits long. It consists of an industry
identifier prefix (89 for telecommunications), followed by a country code, an
issuer identifier number, and an individual account identification number (ITUT, 2006). Aside from the prefix, the components of an ICCID are variable,
making them sometimes difficult to interpret. The ICCID can be read from the
SIM without providing a PIN and can never be updated. The country code and
issuer identifier can be used to determine the network operator providing
service and obtain call data records for the subscriber.
The International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) is a unique 15-digit
numeric identifier assigned to the subscriber. It has a somewhat similar
structure to the ICCID: a Mobile Country Code (MCC), a Mobile Network
Code (MNC), and a Mobile Subscriber Identity Number (MSIN) assigned by
the network operator. The MCC is 3 digits, while the MNC may be either 2 or
3 digits, with the MSIN taking up the remainder. The forth byte of another EF,
Administrative Data (AD), gives the length of the MNC (3GPP 2006).
Networks use IMSIs to identify which network a device owner subscribes and,
if not their network, whether to allow those network subscribers to access
service.
The ICCID and IMSI can be used reliably to identify the subscriber and the
network operator providing service.
Since these identifiers can be
misinterpreted, however, other SIM data can help confirm a finding.
The Mobile Station International Subscriber Directory Number (MSISDN) is
intended to convey the telephone number assigned to the subscriber for
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receiving calls on the phone. Unlike the ICCID and IMSI, however, the
MSISDN is an optional EF. If present, its value can be updated by the
subscriber, making it a less reliable data source, since it would then be
inconsistent with the actual number assigned.
The Service Provider Name (SPN) is an optional EF that contains the name of
the service provider. If present, it can be updated only by the administrator
(i.e., Administrator access). Similarly, the Service Dialling Numbers (SDN)
EF contains numbers of special services such as customer care and, if present,
can help identify to which network the SIM is registered.
3.2 Phonebook and Call Information
The Abbreviated Dialling Numbers (ADN) EF retains a list of names and
phone numbers entered by the subscriber. The storage allows commonly
dialed phone numbers to be selected by name and updated or called using a
menu or special buttons on the phone, providing rudimentary phonebook
operation. Most SIMs provide around 100 slots for ADN entries.
The Last Numbers Dialled (LND) EF contains a list of the most recent phone
numbers called by the device. A name may also be associated with an entry
and stored with a number (e.g., a called phonebook entry). Though a number
appears on the list, a connection may not have been successful, only attempted.
Most SIMs provide only a limited number of slots (e.g., ten) for these entries.
Some phones do not store called numbers on the SIM and instead rely on their
own memory for storage.
3.3 Messaging Information
Text messaging is a means of communication in which messages entered on
one cell phone are sent to another via the mobile phone network. The Short
Message Service (SMS) EF contains text and associated parameters for
messages received from or sent to the network, or are to be sent out as an MSoriginated message. SMS entries contain other information besides the text
itself, such as the time an incoming message was sent, as recorded by the
mobile phone network, the sender's phone number, the SMS Center address,
and the status of the entry. The status of a message entry can be marked as free
space or as occupied by one of the following: a received message to be read, a
received message that has been read, an outgoing message to be sent, or an
outgoing message that has been sent. Messages deleted via the phone interface
are often simply marked as free space and retained on the SIM until they are
overwritten. When a new message is written to an available slot, the unused
portion is filled with padding, overwriting any remnants of a previous message
that might be there.
The capacity for stored messages varies among SIMs. Many cell phones also
use their own internal memory for storing text messages. The choice of
memory where messages are stored (i.e., SIM or phone) can vary depending on
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the phone software and user settings (Willassen 2005). For example, a default
arrangement might be for all incoming messages to be stored on the memory of
the SIM before using internal phone memory, while outgoing messages are
stored only if explicitly requested. Phone models of a particular generation and
manufacturer often behave consistently in this respect (Willassen 2005).
The maximum length of a single SMS message entry is 160 characters of text.
Messages exceeding that length must be broken down into smaller segments by
the sending phone and reassembled by the receiving phone. This feature is
especially useful for foreign languages character sets such as Chinese or Arabic
whose encoding consumes more than twice the number of bits per character
than with English. A reference number parameter identifies the entries whose
segments require reassembly. Such messages are referred to as concatenated
messages. SMS messages may originate through other means than a cell
phone, such as from an Internet SMS server or through electronic mail.
An SMS message can be coded in different ways. The original and most
common encoding scheme is a GSM-specific 7-bit character set packed into a
bit stream (3GPP 1999). Such an encoding cannot be readily interpreted
directly from the raw data using a hex editor, nor supports all languages.
Support for other character sets, such as 16-bit Unicode, was added for
languages whose alphabet cannot be represented using the original Western
European character set (3GPP 2005b).
An Enhanced Messaging Service (EMS) was defined as a way to extend SMS
message content to allow simple multimedia messages to be conveyed. EMS
messages can contain not only formatted text with different font styles and
fonts, but also black and white bitmap pictures and monophonic melodies
(3GPP 2005b). EMS message content resides in the SMS EF along with SMS
message content. EMS messaging is essentially an application-level content
extension to SMS, which conforms to the general SMS message structure and
support for concatenated messages. EMS-enabled devices are backward
compatible by definition with SMS-enabled devices.
3.4 Location Information
A GSM network consists of distinct radio cells used to establish
communications with mobile phones. Cells are grouped together into defined
areas used to manage communications. Phones keep track of the area under
which they fall for both voice and data communications. The Location
Information (LOCI) EF contains the Location Area Information (LAI) for
voice communications. The LAI is composed of the MCC and MNC of the
location area and the Location Area Code (LAC), an identifier for a collection
of cells. When the phone is turned off, the LAI is retained, making it possible
to determine the general locale where the phone was last operating. Because a
location area can contain hundreds or more cells, the locale can be quite broad.
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However, it can nevertheless be useful in narrowing down the region where the
event occurred.
Similarly, the GPRS Location Information (LOCIGPRS) EF contains the
Routing Area Information (RAI) for data communications over the General
Packet Radio Service (GPRS). The RAI is composed of the MCC and MNC of
the routing area and the LAC, as well as a Routing Area Code (RAC), an
identifier of the routing area within the LAC. Routing areas may be defined
the same as location areas or they may involve fewer cells, providing greater
resolution.
4. FORENSICS TOOLS
The main objective of a forensic SIM tool is to extract digital evidence present
in the file system. Besides acquisition, most forensic SIM tools support a
range of examination and reporting functions. Some tools deal exclusively
with SIMs, while others are part of a complete toolkit that also addresses
handsets.
The most important characteristic of a forensic tool is its ability to maintain the
integrity of the original data source being acquired and also that of the
extracted data. The former is done by blocking or otherwise eliminating write
requests to the device containing the data. The latter is done by calculating a
cryptographic hash of the contents of the evidence files created and recurrently
verifying that this value remains unchanged throughout the lifetime of those
files. Preserving integrity not only maintains credibility from a legal
perspective, it also allows any subsequent investigation use the same baseline
for replicating the analysis.
A number of products are available for managing user data on a SIM. They
allow certain data to be read onto a personal computer, updated, and rewritten
back to the SIM. Tools such as these are questionable, since they are not
designed specifically for forensic purposes. Given the number of forensic tools
available, SIM management tools should be avoided.
The SIM must be removed from the phone and inserted into an appropriate
reader for acquisition. Unlike forensic acquisition of a hard drive, capturing a
direct image of the data is not a sensible option because of the protection
mechanisms built into the SIM.
Instead, command directives called
Application Protocol Data Units (APDUs) are sent to the SIM to extract data,
without modification, from relevant EFs in the file system (Casadei 2005).
The APDU protocol is a simple command-response exchange. Each element
of the file system defined in the standard has a unique numeric identifier
assigned, which can be used to reference the element and perform some
operation, such as reading the contents in the case of an acquisition tool (3GPP
2005a).
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Forensic SIM tools require either a specialized reader that accepts a SIM
directly or a general-purpose reader for a full-size smart card. For the latter, a
standard-size smart card adapter is needed to house the SIM for use with the
reader. Table 1 lists several SIM forensic tools and which of the primary
functions of acquisition, examination, and reporting are supported. The first
four listed, Cell Seizure, GSM .XRY, Mobiledit!, and TULP2G, also handle
phone memory acquisition. Note that some SIM data, but not all, can be
recovered via the handset using such tools. However, some forensic issues
may arise when acquiring SIM data via the phone. The most common one is
that the status of an “unread” message can be changed to “read.”
Table 1: SIM Tools
Tool

Function

Cell Seizure
GSM .XRY
Mobiledit! Forensic
TULP 2G
Forensic Card Reader
ForensicSIM
SIMCon
SIMIS

Acquisition, Examination, Reporting2
Acquisition, Examination, Reporting3
Acquisition, Examination, Reporting4
Acquisition, Reporting5
Acquisition, Reporting6
Acquisition, Examination, Reporting7
Acquisition, Examination, Reporting8
Acquisition, Examination, Reporting9

4.1 Evidence Recovery
While all of the stored SIM data may potentially have evidentiary value, a
good deal of the data is network service related and has little direct evidentiary
value. Generally, SIM forensic tools do not recover every possible item on a
SIM. The breadth of coverage also varies considerably among tools. Table 2
entries give an overview of those items recovered, listed at the left, by the
various SIM forensic tools, listed across the top.

2

Version 2.0.0.33660, see www.paraben-forensics.com
Version 2.5, see www.msab.com/en
4
Version 1.95, see www.mobiledit.com
5
Version 1.1.0.2, see tulp2g.sourceforge.net
6
Version 1.0.1, see www.becker-partner.de/forensic/intro_e.htm
7
Version 1.3.0.0, see www.radio-tactics.com/forensic_sim.htm
8
Version 1.1, see www.simcon.no
9
Version 2.0.13, see www.crownhillmobile.com
3
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Cell
Seizure

GSM
.XRY

Mobiledit!

TULP
2G

FCR

Forensic
SIM

SIMCon

SIMIS

Table 2: Content Recovery Coverage

IMSI

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

ICCID

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

MSISDN

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

SDN

X

X

X

X

X

SPN

X

X

X

X

X

Phase

X

X

X

X

X

X

ADN

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

LND

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

LOCI

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

GPRSLOCI

X

X

X

X

SMS/EMS
• Occupied
• Deleted

4.2 Decoding and Translation
Forensic tools can present acquired data to the user in several ways, as
illustrated in Figure 3. Each step, however, can introduce errors. The most
basic form is the raw encoded data received in response to an APDU request.
As mentioned earlier, text encoded in the packed 7-bit GSM alphabet is
onerous and time consuming to decode manually. Another less onerous
decoding involved binary coded decimal (BCD) numeric identifiers. Most, but
not all, tools decode raw data into a usable form for interpretation by the user,
wherever possible.
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Figure 3: Data Decoding and Translation
Several tools go beyond decoding and attempt to translate the decoded data
into a form more meaningful to the user, using some database. Translation is
particularly the case with numeric data. For example, the BCD-encoded value
of the MCC and MNC portion of the LAI, “130014,“ decodes to “310410,”
where 310 is the MCC value and 410 is the MNC value. The country code 310
is assigned to the United States, while the network code 410 is assigned to
Cingular.
5. TOOL ASSESSMENT
SIMs are highly standardized devices whose interface, behavior, and content
are relatively uniform. All of the SIM tools broadly support any SIM for
acquisition via an external reader. Scenarios were used to populated SIM data
to gauge the capabilities of the forensic tool to acquire information. The
emphasis in the scenarios is on loading the SIM with specific kinds of
information for recovery. Once a scenario is performed using a suitable GSM
phone or SIM management program, the tool can logically acquire the SIM.
The scenarios are not intended to be exhaustive or to serve as a formal product
evaluation. However, they attempt to cover a range of data commonly
encountered when examining a SIM and are useful in determining the
capabilities afforded an examiner. Table 3 gives an overview of the SIM
scenarios. Note that none of the scenarios attempt to confirm whether the
integrity of the data on a SIM is preserved when applying a tool – that topic
was outside the scope of the effort.
Table 3: SIM Scenarios
Scenario
Basic Data

Description
Determine whether the tool can recover core subscriber
(i.e., IMSI, ICCID, and SPN elementary files),
phonebook (i.e., ADN elementary file), call (i.e., LND
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Scenario

Location Data

EMS Data

Foreign Language
Data

Description
elementary file), and SMS message information on the
SIM, including deleted SMS entries, and whether all of
the data is properly decoded and displayed.
Determine whether the tool can recover locationrelated information (i.e., LOCI and LOCIGPRS
elementary files), on the SIM, and whether all of the
data is properly decoded and displayed.
Determine whether the tool can recover EMS messages
over 160 characters in length and containing nontextual content, and whether all of the data is properly
decoded and displayed for both active and deleted
messages.
Determine whether the tool can recover SMS messages
and phonebook data from the SIM that are in a foreign
language, and whether all of the data is properly
decoded and displayed.

The scenario results for each tool are weighed against the predefined
expectations and assigned a ranking. The entry “Meet” indicates that the
software met the expectations of the scenario for the device in question. Since
the scenarios are acquisition oriented, this ranking generally means that all of
the identified data was successfully recovered. Similarly, the entry “Below”
indicates that the software fell short of fully meeting expectations.
A “Below” ranking is often a consequence of a tool performing a logical
acquisition and being unable to recover deleted data, which is understandable.
However, the ranking may also be due to active data on the device not being
successfully recovered, which is more of a concern. A good example of this is
SMS messages that have been deleted, but not overwritten by another message.
The entry “Miss” indicates that the software unsuccessfully met any
expectations, highlighting an area for improvement.
Table 4 gives a summary of the results for each tool used with several test
SIMs: the 5343 from T-Mobile, the 8778 from Cingular, and the 1144 from
AT&T. Note that very few misses were experienced. The main ones were due
to difficulties that Cell Seizure and Forensic SIM had in successfully acquiring
any data from the Cingular SIM. The remaining ones were due to the limited
breadth of coverage Mobiledit! has for SIM data, as noted earlier in Table 2.
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Table 4: Tool Result Summary
Tool

Cell Seizure

GSM .XRY

Mobiledit!
Forensic

TULP 2G

Forensic Card
Reader

ForensicSIM

SIMCon

SIMIS

SIM

Scenario
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data
Basic Data
Location Data
EMS Data
Foreign Language Data

88

5343

8778

1144

Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Meet
Below
Below
Miss
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Below
Below
Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Meet
Meet
Meet
Meet
Meet
Meet
Below
Below

Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Meet
Below
Meet
Below
Below
Miss
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Below
Below
Miss
Miss
Miss
Miss
Below
Meet
Meet
Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Below

Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Meet
Below
Below
Miss
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Below
Meet
Below
Below
Below
Below
Below
Below
Below
Below
Below
Meet
Meet
Meet
Meet
Below
Below
Below
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The remainder of this section discusses areas where the forensic tools fell
below expectations and gives some specific examples. A more comprehensive
discussion is available elsewhere (Ayers, R. et al. 2005).
5.1 Basic Data
Generally, recovering Basic Data posed little problems for most tools, with the
exception of deleted SMS data. Certain tools did not recover some useful data,
as noted in Table 2. A more serious concern was that a couple of the tools
failed to acquire the SIM at all. One tool failed to display the full name of a
maximum size phonebook entry and another truncated all names by one
character. In both cases, other output provided by tools could be used to view
the missing characters. One tool consistently prepended the IMSI with a parity
quartet.
An interesting problem occurred in translating the IMSI values of the SIMs.
Several European tools failed to translate the IMSI correctly, ignoring the AD
value that contains the size of the MNC portion to use when decoding the value
to a network name, and instead defaulting to 2-digits. Because North
American MNCs are 3-digit in size, a translation error occurred. However,
because the decoded data used for translation was also provided, one could
manually perform a correct translation.
5.2 Location Data
As noted in Table 2, several tools recovered LOCI, but not LOCIGPRS data.
One tool recovered neither. One of the tools that recovered data failed to
report the MCC/MNC portions of the LAI, while another incorrectly presented
a LOCI component value.
The MNC portion of the LAI, a three-digit value, was incorrectly decoded by
one tool. A couple of the tools did not attempt to translate the LAI and RAI
codes into a network name and avoided the problem. One of them did not even
attempt to decode the raw data to simplify manual translation.
5.3 EMS Data
Recovery of EMS text messages greater that 160 characters posed little
problems for most tools, except for two tools that had problems recovering
deleted EMS messages, the same ones noted in Table 2 for deleted SMS
messages. EMS messages bearing images were a different story. Two sizes of
images were embedded with text: small 16x16 pixel and large 32x32 pixel
images. The results are shown in Table 5.
Only two of the tools, GSM .XRY and SIMCon successfully acquired and
displayed both size of embedded images. The only other tool to acquire an
image successfully, TULP 2G, did so only for the small image. For the large
image, it failed to report the presence of the message, missing it entirely. Two
of the other tools successfully recovered the text, but misinterpreted the image
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value, while another tool recovered the text and provided a notification that
image data was present.
Table 5: Picture Messages with Text
Text & Small Image
Cell Seizure

Text & Large Image

Unsuccessful Acquisition –
Cingular SIM

lßìOß&/Ψà

Picture msg

Emspictur

GSM XRY
Mobiledit!

Missed Entirely

TULP 2G

SIMIS

@@@@@@@x?P¡K?
00@@@@@@@@Picture
msg

Forensic SIM

Unsuccessful Acquisition –
Cingular SIM

Forensic CR

#"èY@@@@@@@@@x£Pò
BaK?ààààlÆ??00@@@@@
@@@Picture msg

?@@@ @@ 耀@??@@?
@(@$@?@?@?
?4p@@D
ฆ ?(Xq?x7
@q,?@p巀@ba?@@D?
@??P?@x였@?@p尀@??@$
?????8x솀@
S
mspict
ur
Header – Large Picture
User Data – Emspictur
¥!èL@@p£@@@ß@@@?è
@@@££@@ò
@@¡@ò@@è@$@¿@¿@üàà
ààààààààà?4p@@DàøÆ¡(Xq¥
x7?
@q,¥@på7@@baù@¿Él@@
D¥
@¡?P£@xì?@@à@¥@på0@
@ü£ù@¿É¿@$ö¥ø¿¡?¡£8xìÆ
@@àààààààààSàààà?Emspict
u

SIMCon

5.4 Foreign Language Data
Foreign language data occurred in both the ADN phonebook and SMS message
entries. Both French and Asian characters were used. Table 6 illustrates the
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results for SMS messages. Only one tool failed to display French language
messages correctly. However, using a dump feature, the correct data could be
found. For Asian messages, only one tool, SIMCon, correctly displayed the
message. Most of the others came close, but appended spurious characters.
The remainder garbled the message contents, though the date/time stamp and
other header information were presented correctly.
The results for French and Asian ADN entries generally followed those for
SMS messages. However, one of the tools performed worse for French ADN
entries than for SMS message entries, while another performed worse for
Asian ADN entries than for SMS message entries.
Table 6: Foreign Language Messages
French
Cell Seizure

Asian

Il est entété mais sincère

Headers OK,
Message Garbled
阿婆家里面对于是否则的

GSM XRY
Il est entété mais sincère

确实现在家里面对于—
阿婆
阿婆家里面对于是否则的

Mobiledit!
Il est entété mais sincère

确实现在家里面对于˥敐
签

TULP 2G

SIMIS

Il est entété mais sincère

Il est ent鴩 mais sinc貥

Forensic SIM

Il est entété mais sincère

Forensic CR

Il est entété mais sincère

SIMCon

Il est entété mais sincère
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Headers OK,
Message Garbled
Headers OK,
Message Garbled
阿婆家里面对于是否则的
确实现在家里面对于
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6. CONCLUSIONS
Forensic examination of cellular devices is a growing subject area in computer
forensics. Forensic examination tools translate data to a format and structure
that is understandable by the examiner and can be effectively used to identify
and recover evidence.
However, tools may contain some degree of
inaccuracies.
For example, the tool’s implementation may contain a
programming error; a specification used by the tool to translate encoded bits
into data comprehensible by the examiner may be inaccurate or out of date; or
the protocol used to access the SIM may be incorrect, causing the tool to
function improperly in certain situations.
Over time, experience with a tool provides an understanding of its limitations,
allowing an examiner to compensate where possible for any shortcomings or to
turn to other means of recovery. Practice in mock examinations can help gain
an in-depth understanding of a tool's capabilities and limitations, which often
involve subtle distinctions, and also provide the opportunity to customize
facilities of the tool for later use.
Forensic software tools for SIMs are in the mid-stages of maturity. While the
tools discussed in this paper generally performed well and had adequate
functionality, new versions are expected to improve and better meet
investigative requirements. For instance, during the course of preparing this
paper, a new version for nearly every tool was issued, which included
functionality enhancements and occasionally some deficiencies. Because
variability can occur between versions of tools, quality measures should be
applied to ensure that results remain consistent and any variations understood.
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